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Abstract. Recently, a few chosen-ciphertext secure (CCA2-secure) vari-
ants of the McEliece public-key encryption (PKE) scheme in the stan-
dard model were introduced. All the proposed schemes are based on en-
cryption repetition paradigm and use general transformation from CPA-
secure scheme to a CCA2-secure one. Therefore, the resulting encryption
scheme needs separate encryption and has large key size compared to the
original scheme, which complex public key size problem in the code-based
PKE schemes. Thus, the proposed schemes are not sufficiently efficient
to be used in practice.
In this work, we propose an efficient CCA2-secure variant of the McEliece
PKE scheme in the standard model. The main novelty is that, unlike
previous approaches, our approach is a generic conversion and can be
applied to any one-way trapdoor function (OW-TDF), the lowest-level
security notion in the context of public-key cryptography, resolving a big
fundamental and central problem that has remained unsolved in the past
two decades.
Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography, McEliece cryptosystem, Per-
mutation algorithm, CCA2 security, Standard model.
1 Introduction
Post-quantum cryptography has obtained great attention in recent years. Code-
based cryptography holds a great promise for the post-quantum cryptography,
as it enjoys very strong security proofs based on average-case hardness [22], rela-
tively fast and efficient encryption/decryption nature, as well as great simplicity.
In the context of code-based cryptography, there are two well-known public-key
encryption (PKE) schemes, namely McEliece [13] and Niederreiter [15] PKE
schemes. The McEliece encryption scheme was the first PKE scheme based on
linear error-correcting codes. It has a very fast and efficient encryption proce-
dure, but it has one big flaw: the size of the public key. Recently, how to reduce
the public key size and how to secure the parameter choice in the code-based
cryptography are deeply explored [1,2,3,9,14].
Semantic security (a.k.a indistinguishability) against adaptive chosen cipher-
text attacks (CCA2 security) is one of the strongest known notions of security
for the PKE schemes was introduced by Rackoff and Simon [20]. It is possible to
produce CCA2-secure variants of the code-based PKE schemes in the random
oracle model [4,11,12], however, CCA2 security in the standard model has not
been widely discussed. To the best of our knowledge, only a few papers have
touched this research issue.
1.1 Related work
There are mainly two class of CCA2-secure code-based PKE schemes in the
standard model.
– CCA-secure schemes based on syndrome decoding problem. Freeman et al.
[10] used Rosen-Segev approach [21] to introduce a correlation-secure trap-
door function related to the hardness of syndrome decoding. Their con-
struction is based on the Niederreiter PKE scheme. Very recently, Preetha
Mathew et al. [19] proposed a somewhat efficient variant of the Niederre-
iter scheme based on lossy trapdoor functions [17], which avoids encryption
repetition paradigm.
– CCA-secure schemes based on general decoding problem. The first CCA2-
secure variants of the McEliece cryptosystem was introduced by Dowsley et
al. [5]. They proposed a scheme that resembles the Rosen-Segev approach
trying to apply it to the McEliece PKE scheme. Their construction has some
ambiguity. The scheme does not rely on a collection of functions but instead
defines a structure called k-repetition PKE scheme. This is essentially an
application of k-samples of the PKE to the same input, in which the de-
cryption algorithm also includes a verification step on the k outputs. The
encryption algorithm produces a signature directly on the McEliece cipher-
texts instead of introducing a random vector x as in the original Rosen-Segev
scheme; therefore a CPA-secure variant of the McEliece cryptosystem is nec-
essary to achieve CCA2 security [18]. Very recently, Do¨ttling et al. [6] showed
that Nojima et al. [16] randomized version of the McEliece cryptosystem is
k-repetitions CPA-secure and, as we mentioned earlier, it can obtain CCA2
security by using a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. In a sub-
sequent work, Persichetti [18] proposed a CCA2-secure PKE scheme based
on the McEliece assumptions using the original Rosen-Segev approach.
1.2 Motivation
To date, as we stated above, all the proposed CCA2-secure code-based PKE
schemes in the standard model are based on either lossy and correlation-secure
trapdoor functions or k-repetitions encryption paradigm. Therefore, the resulting
encryption schemes are not efficient as they need to run encryption/decryption
algorithms several times and use a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme
to handle CCA2 security related issues. Moreover, in these schemes, excluding
the keys of the signature scheme, the public/secret keys are 2k-times larger than
the public/secret keys of the original scheme, which complex the public key
length problem in the code-based PKE schemes. Although the Preetha Mathew
et al.’s scheme [19] avoids k-repetitions paradigm, it yet needs to run encryp-
tion/decryption algorithms 2-times and the public/secret keys are larger than
the original Niederreiter scheme. Further, it also uses a strongly unforgeable
one-time signature scheme to achieve CCA2 security, and so needs separate en-
cryption. Hence, how to design an efficient CCA2-secure code-based encryption
scheme in the standard model is still worth of investigation. This motivates us
to investigate new approach for construction efficient such schemes in the stan-
dard model without using encryption repetition and generic transformation from
CPA-secure schemes to a CCA2-secure one.
1.3 Our Contributions
To tackle the above challenging issues, we introduce a randomized encoding al-
gorithm called PCA and use it along with the McEliece PKE scheme to construct
a CCA2-secure PKE scheme in the standard model. Our contributions in this
paper are:
– The main novelty is that our construction is a generic conversion and can be
applied to any low-level primitive. To further demonstrate the usefulness of
our approach, in Section 4 we also introduce direct “black-box” construction
of a CCA2-secure PKE scheme from any TDF in the standard model, re-
solving a big fundamental and central problem in the context of public-key
cryptography that has remained unsolved in the past two decades.
– Our proposed scheme is more efficient, the publick/secret keys are as in the
original scheme and the encryption/decryption complexity are comparable
to the original scheme.
– This novel approach leads to the elimination of the encryption repetition
and using strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme.
– This scheme can be used for encryption of long length messages without
employing the hybrid encryption method and symmetric encryption.
Organisation. In the next section, we briefly explain some mathematical back-
ground and definitions. Then, in Section 3, we introduce our proposed scheme.
Finally, a generalized construction based on OW-TDFs will be given in Section
4.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Notation
We represent a binary string in general by bold face letter such as x =
(x1, . . . xn). Regular small font letter x denotes its corresponding decimal value,
that is x =
∑n
i=1 xi2
(n−i) and |x| denotes its binary length. If k ∈ N then {0, 1}
k
denote the set of k-bit strings, 1k denote a string of k ones and {0, 1}
∗
denote
the set of bit strings of finite length. y ← x denotes the assignment to y of the
value x. For a set S, s ← S denote the assignment to s of a uniformly random
element of S. For a deterministic algorithm A, we write x← AO(y, z) to mean
that x is assigned the output of running A on inputs y and z, with access to
oracle O. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, we may write x ← AO(y, z, R) to
mean the output of A when run on inputs y and z with oracle access to O and
using the random coins R. We denote by Pr[E] the probability that the event E
occurs. If a and b are two strings of bits, we denote by a‖b their concatenation.
Lsbx1(a) means the right x1 bits of a and Msbx2(a) means the left x2 bits of a.
Since the proposed cryptosystem is code-based, a few notations regarding
coding theory are introduced. Let F2 be the finite field with 2 elements {0, 1},
k ∈ N be a security parameter. A binary linear-error correcting code C of length
n and dimension k or an [n, k]-code is a k-dimensional subspace of Fn2 . Elements
of Fn2 are called words, and elements of C are called codewords. If the minimum
hamming distance between any two codewords is d, then the code is a [n, k, d]
code. The Hamming weight of a codeword x, wt(x), is the number of non-zero
bits in the codeword. For t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋, the code is said to be t-error correcting if
it detects and corrects errors of weight at most t. Hence, the code can also be
represented as a [n, k, 2t + 1] code. The generator matrix G ∈ Fk×n2 of a [n, k]
linear code C is a matrix of rank k whose rows span the code C.
2.2 Definitions
Definition 1 (Trapdoor functions) A trapdoor function family is a triple
of algorithms TDF = (Tdg,F,F−1), where Tdg is probabilistic and on input 1k
generates an evaluation/trapdoor key-pair (ek, td) ← Tdg(1k). F(ek, ·) imple-
ments a function fek(·) over {0, 1}
k and F−1(td, ·) implements its inverse f−1(·).
Definition 2 (One-wayness) Let A be an inverter and define its OW-
advantage against TDF as
AdvowTDF,A(k) = Pr
[
x = x′ :
(ek, td)← Tdg(1k);x← {0, 1}k
y ← F(ek, x);x′ ← A(ek, y)
]
.
Trapdoor function TDF is one-way if Advow
TDF,A(k) is negligible for every PPT
inverter A.
Definition 3 (Circular Shift) A circular (cyclic) shift is the operation of re-
arranging the components in a string circularly with a prescribed number of po-
sitions. Thus, a q-position circular shift (or circular q-shift) defines as the op-
eration in which the i-th sample, si, replace with the (i + q mod n)-th sample
in a n sample ensemble. We denote this operation by CSq,n(si) = s(i+q mod n),
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 4 (General Decoding Problem) Given a generator matrix G ∈
Fk×n2 and a word m ∈ F
n
2 , find a codeword c ∈ F
k
2 such that e = m − cG has
Hamming weight wt(e) ≤ t.
Definition 5 (General Decoding Assumption) Let C be an [n, k, d]-binary
linear code defined by a k × n generator matrix G with the minimal distance d,
and t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋. An adversary A that takes an input of a word m ∈ F
n
2 , returns
a codeword c ∈ Fk2. We consider the following random experiment on GDP
problem.
ExpGDPA :
c ∈ Fk2 ← A(G,m ∈ F
n
2 )
if x =m− cG and wt(x) ≤ t
then b← 1, else b← 0
return b.
We define the corresponding success probability of A in solving the GDP problem
via
SuccGDPA = Pr[Exp
GDP
A = 1].
Let τ ∈ N and ε ∈ [0, 1]. We call GDP to be (τ, ε)-secure if no polynomial
algorithm A running in time τ has success SuccGDPA ≥ ε.
Definition 6 (Public-key encryption) A public-key encryption (PKE)
scheme is a triple of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms
(Gen, Enc, Dec) such that:
– Gen is a probabilistic polynomial time key generation algorithm which takes a
security parameter 1n as input and outputs a public key pk and a secret-key
sk. We write (pk, sk)← Gen(1n). The public key specifies the message space
M and the ciphertext space C.
– Enc is a (possibly) probabilistic polynomial time encryption algorithm which
takes as input a public key pk, a m ∈ M and random coins r, and outputs
a ciphertext C ∈ C. We write Enc(pk,m; r) to indicate explicitly that the
random coins r is used and Enc(pk,m) if fresh random coins are used.
– Dec is a deterministic polynomial time decryption algorithm which takes as
input a secret-key sk and a ciphertext C ∈ C, and outputs either a message
m ∈ M or an error symbol ⊥. We write m← Dec(C, sk).
– (Completeness) For any pair of public and secret-keys generated by Gen
and any message m ∈ M it holds that Dec(sk, Enc(pk,m; r)) = m with
overwhelming probability over the randomness used by Gen and the random
coins r used by Enc.
Definition 7 (CCA2 security) A public-key encryption scheme is secure
against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (i.e. CCA2-secure) if the advantage
of any two-stage PPT adversary A = (A1, A2) in the following experiment is
negligible in the security parameter k:
Expcca2PKE,A(k) :
(pk, sk)← Gen(1k)
(m0,m1, state)← A
Dec(sk,·)
1 (pk) s.t. |m0| = |m1|
b← {0, 1}
C∗ ← Enc(pk,mb)
b′ ← A
Dec(sk,·)
2 (C
∗, state)
if b = b
′
return 1, else return 0.
The attacker may query a decryption oracle with a ciphertext C at any point
during its execution, with the exception that A2 is not allowed to query
Dec(sk, .) with “challenge” ciphertext C∗. The decryption oracle returns b
′
←
A
Dec(sk,·)
2 (C
∗, state). The attacker wins the game if b = b′ and the probability of
this event is defined as Pr[Exp cca2PKE,A (k)]. We define the advantage of A in the
experiment as
AdvInd−cca2PKE,A (k) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Expcca2PKE,A (k) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ . (1)
2.3 The McEliece PKE scheme
The McEliece PKE consists of a triplet of probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithms (GenMcE,EncMcE,DecMcE).
– System parameters. q, n, t ∈ N, where t≪ n.
– Key Generation. GenMcE take as input security parameter 1
k and generate
the following matrices:
1. A k × n generator matrix G of a code G over Fq of dimension k and
minimum distance d ≥ 2t+ 1. (A binary irreducible Goppa code in the
original proposal).
2. A k × k random binary non-singular matrix S
3. A n× n random permutation matrix P.
Then, Gen compute the k × n matrix Gpub = SGP and outputs a public key
pk and a secret key sk, where
pk = (Gpub, t) and pk = (S, DG ,P)
where DG is an efficient decoding algorithm for G.
– Encryption. EncMcE(pk) takes plaintext m ∈ F
k
2 as input and randomly
choose a vector e ∈ Fn2 wit Hamming weight wt(e) = t and computes the
ciphertext c as follows.
c =mGpub ⊕ e.
– Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext c, DecMcE(sk, c) first calculates
cP−1 = (mS)G⊕ eP−1
and then apply the decoding algorithm DG to it. If the decoding succeeds,
output
m = (mS)S−1.
Otherwise, output ⊥.
There are two computational assumptions underlying the security of the
McEliece scheme.
Assumption 1 (Indistinguishability1). The matrix G output by Gen is
computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen matrix of the same
size.
Assumption 2 (Decoding hardness). Decoding a random linear code with
parameters n, k, w is hard.
Note that Assumption 2 is in fact equivalent to assuming the hardness of
GDP. It is immediately clear that the following corollary is true.
Corollary 1. Given that both the above assumptions hold, the McEliece cryp-
tosystem is one-way secure under passive attacks.
3 The proposed cryptosystem
In this section, we introduce our conversion. Our construction consists of two
parts: 1) Encryption of random coins r using the original McEliece PKE scheme;
2) Randomized encoding of the plaintext, where randomization is done using
r (that used for consistency check) based on a heuristic encoding algorithm.
Encoding includes a permutation and combination on the message bits that
performs using an algorithm called permutation combination algorithm (PCA).
3.1 PCA encoding algorithm
To encode messagem ∈ {0, 1}n with n≫ k, we firstly pick coins r ∈ {0, 1}k, r 6=
0k, 1k uniformly at random, where k is the security parameter. Let wt(r) = h be
its Hamming weight. We divide m into l blocks (b1‖ . . . ‖bl) with equal binary
length ⌈n/l⌉, where l = h if h ≥ k − h, else l = k − h. If l ∤ n, then we
should pad m. In such cases, we can sample a random binary string (RBS)
from r, say RBS = Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n(r), and pad it on the right of m
2. Therefore,
if l | n then v = n/l, RBS = ϕ (the empty set) and bl = Lsbv (m), else v =
⌈n/l⌉, RBS is a random string with length l ⌈n/l⌉−n which sampled from r and
1 This statement is not true in general. See [7,8] for instance.
2 Note that since l ∈ [⌈k/2⌉, k−1], the length of sampled RBS, i.e. l⌈n/l⌉−n, is smaller
than k, i.e. the length of r. Therefor, for all cases we do not have any problem for
sampling RBS from r.
dl = Lsb(n−(l−1)⌈n/l⌉) (m)‖RBS. Now, we perform a secure permutation on the
message blocks bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ l with the following algorithm.
First, note that any positive integer s, 1 ≤ s ≤ l!− 1 uniquely can be shown
as
s = u1 × (l − 1)! + u2 × (l − 2)! + · · ·+ ul × 0, 0 ≤ ui ≤ l − i.
Note that based on this definition we have ul = 0. The sequence Us = (u1, . . . , ul)
is called factorial carry value of s. We define original sequence m0 as m0 =
(b1‖ . . . ‖bl). Recombine all elements of the original sequencem
0 obtain l!−1 new
sequences m1, . . . ,m(l!−1), which any sequence owns a corresponding factorial
carry value. Using the factorial carry value of s, we can efficiently obtain any
sequence ms, 1 ≤ s ≤ l!− 1 with the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 (PCA encoding algorithm)
Input: Message m ∈ {0, 1}n, coins r ∈ {0, 1}k and integer s, 1 ≤ s ≤ l!− 1.
Output: Encoded message y′ =ms = (b′1‖ . . . ‖b
′
l).
Setup:
1. h← wt(r). If 2h ≥ k then l ← h, else l← k − h.
2. If l | n then set RBS = ϕ; otherwise, RBS← MSb(l⌈n/l⌉−n) (r).
3. m′ ← m‖RBS and divide m′ into l blocks (b1‖ . . . ‖bl) with equal length
v = ⌈n/l⌉.
Permutation:
1. Write s as s =
∑l−1
i=1 ui (l− i)! + ul × 0, 0 ≤ ui ≤ l − i.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ l:
If ui = 0, then b
′
i ← bi;
Else, b′i ← bi+ui , and for 1 ≤ j ≤ ui:
b′i+j ← bi;
3. Return y′ =ms = (b′1‖ . . . ‖b
′
l).
Note that the number and the length of the message blocks are variable and
changed by r.
It is clear that the above encoding algorithm satisfies correctness. Namely,
for any (m, r) we have
∀m ∈ {0, 1}n, r ∈ {0, 1}k and s ∈ N : PCA−1(PCA(m, r, s), r, s) =m.
We illustrate PCA encoding algorithm with a small example. Suppose m =
(m1, . . . ,m512) and r = (r1, . . . , r25) with h =
∑25
i=1 ri = 12. Since 2h < k, thus
l = k − h = 13. Therefore, the algorithm divides m into 13 blocks with equal
length v = ⌈n/l⌉ = ⌈512/13⌉ = 40. In this case, we have to sample a string with
length l⌈n/l⌉ − n = 8 from r and pad it on the right of m. Therefore, we have
m′ = (m1, . . . , m40︸ ︷︷ ︸
b1
‖m41, . . . , m80︸ ︷︷ ︸
b2
‖ . . . ‖m481, . . . ,m512‖r1, . . . r8︸ ︷︷ ︸
b13
).
We choose integer s, 1 ≤ s ≤ 13!− 1, say s = 4819995015. We have
4819995015 = 10× 12! + 0× 11! + 8× 10! + 2× 9! + 5× 8! + 4× 7! + 1× 6!
+3× 5! + 0× 4! + 2× 3! + 1× 2! + 1× 1! + 0
Thus, the factorial carry value of m4819995015 is {10, 0, 8, 2, 5, 4, 1, 3, 0, 2, 1, 1, 0}.
Compute sequence D4819995015 with its factorial carry value
{10, 0, 8, 2, 5, 4, 1, 3, 0, 2, 1, 1, 0}. We have
10−−{b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9, b10, b11, b12, b13} → b11
0− −{b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9, b10, b12, b13} → b1
8− −{b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9, b10, b12, b13} → b10
2− −{b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9, b12, b13} → b4
...
1− −{b5, b6, b13} → b6
1− −{b5, b13} → b13
0− −{b5} → b5
Therefore, the permutation of sequence m4819995015 is
(b11‖b1‖b10‖b4‖b8‖b7‖b3‖b9‖b2‖b12‖b6‖b13‖b5).
3.2 The proposed scheme
Now, we are ready to define our conversion. Given a McEliece PKE scheme
Π = (GenMcE,EncMcE,DecMcE), we transform it into CCA2-secure PKE scheme
Π′ = (Gencca2,Enccca2,Deccca2).
Key Generation. On security parameter k, Gencca2(1
k) run (skMcE, pkMcE)←
GenMcE(1
k) to obtain skMcE = (S, DG ,P) and pkMcE = (G
pub, t) as in subsection
2.3. It also choose target collision resistant (aka universal one-way) hash func-
tion T : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k and pseudorandom generator G : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n.
pk = {(S, DG ,P), G,T} is the public key and sk = {(G
pub, t), G,T} is the secret
key.
Encryption. To create ciphertext, encryption algorithm in some cases
performs operations in decimal, and in other cases it performs operations in
binary representation of the components. When we do operations in decimal,
we show components by regular small fonts, and when we perform operations in
binary, we show components by bold face fonts. To encrypt messagem ∈ {0, 1}n
with n≫ k, Enccca2:
1. Randomly choose error vector e ∈ {0, 1}k wit Hamming weight wt(e) = t.
2. Compute r = T(e) ∈ {0, 1}k, r 6= 0k, 1k. Let wt(r) = h. If 2h > k then l ← h,
else l ← k − h.
3. Compute m˜ =m⊕G(r).
4. Set s =
∑l−1
i=1 ui(l− i)!+ul× 0, where ui = (r+ i) mod (l− i), 1 ≤ i ≤ l− 1
and ul = 0, and run PCA encoding algorithm (Algorithm 1) on inputs
(m˜, r, s) to generate encoded message y′ = PCA(m˜, r, s). Note that we have
Us = (u1, . . . , ul−1, 0).
5. Perform a circular q-shift on the encoded message y′ and compute sequence
y = CSq,|y′|(y
′), where q = r mod n. Note n and so q < |y′|.
6. Compute
C1 = (hy + r¯)r + z, C2 = EncMcE(pk, r; e) = rG
pub ⊕ e,
where r, y are the corresponding decimal value of r and y. r¯ is the decimal value
of the complement of r and z =
∑l−1
i=1 ui.
As we know, in hybrid PKE schemes XOR alone cannot perfectly hide
challenge bit to the CCA2 adversary. To handle CCA2 security related issues,
we increase obfuscation of the XORed message by a) perform a randomized
encoding on its bits and b) perform a secure circular shift on the bits of encoded
message, whose shift step depends on the value of r. Moreover, we disguise
encoded message and conceal its bits by setting C1 = (hy + r¯)r + z in order
to decrease malleability of the ciphertext. (See Proposition 1). Therefore, the
CCA2 adversary to extract any useful information about challenge bit from C1
must first recover the same coins r that was used to create the ciphertext from
the McEliece PKE scheme, which is impossible if the McEliece PKE scheme be
secure.
Decryption. To recover message m from C = (C1, C2), Deccca2 perform
the following steps.
1. Compute coins r as r = DecMcE(skMcE, C2) and retrieve error vector e =
C2 ⊕ rG
pub
2. Check whether
r
?
= T(e) (2)
holds3 and reject if not (consistency check). If it holds compute wt(r) = h.
If 2h ≥ k then l← h, else l ← k − h.
3. Compute s =
∑l−1
i=1 ui(l− i)!, Us = (u1, . . . , ul−1, 0) and z =
∑l−1
i=1 ui, where
ui = (r + i) mod (l − i).
3 In deterministic code-based PKE schemes such as Niederreiter PKE scheme, we
don’t need to perform this checking. In these schemes since encryption algorithm
is deterministic, each message has one pre-image. Therefore if C2 6= C
∗
2 , then r =
Dec(C2, sk) 6= Dec(C
∗
2 , sk) = r
∗. But in the McEliece encryption scheme, for i-th
and j-th unit vectors ei and ej (with i 6= j) if wt(e, ei) = 1 and wt(e, ej) = 0, then
C′2 = (rG
pub ⊕ e) ⊕ ei ⊕ ej is a correct ciphertext, since the Hamming weight of
e⊕ei⊕ej is t. Therefore, queried ciphertext of the form (C1, C2⊕ei⊕ej) may leaks
information of the original message. Thus, we need to check well-formedness of the
ciphertext and reject such maliciously-formed one.
4. Compute
y =
(C1 − z)/r − r¯
h
, (3)
and reject if y is not a (l⌈n/l⌉)-bit integer (consistency check). Note that if
l | n then |y| = n.
5. Compute y′ = CS−1q,|y|(y), where y is the binary representation of y. q = r
mod n and |y′| = |y|.
6. Compute m˜ = PCA−1(y′, r, s).
7. Compute m′ = m˜⊕G(r) and RBS = Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n(r). Check wether
Lsbl⌈n/l⌉−n(m
′)
?
= RBS (4)
holds and reject if not (consistency check). If it holds output
m = Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n(m
′), (5)
else output ⊥.
Remark 1 Note that if either y or r be illegal values, then the decryption algo-
rithm outputs a random string.
Proposition 1 The ciphertext C1 is non-malleable.
Proof. We say that (Cˆ1, C2) is a valid forgery on (C1, C2) if yˆ differ from y
in some bits, where yˆ and y are the corresponding binary representation of
yˆ = ((Cˆ1− z)/r− r¯)/h and y = ((C1− z)/r− r¯)/h respectively. If the adversary
can produce such Cˆ1, then he can guess challenge bit from mˆ = Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n( ˆ˜m⊕
G(r)). Without loss of generality, we assume yˆ and y differ in i-th bit. Namely
yˆ = y⊕ei, where ei is the i-th unit vector. Thus, we should have yˆ = y±2
i. That
is, Cˆ1 = (hyˆ+ r¯)r+ z = C1± 2
ihr. Since secret coins r ∈ {0, 1}k is not known to
the adversary, thus the probability that the adversary produces a valid forgery
on C1 is negligible and it is 2
−k. This is because in the encryption algorithm we
set C1 = (hy + r¯)r + z.
Theorem 1 Suppose Π = (GenMcE,EncMcE,DecMcE) be the McEliece PKE
scheme. Then, the proposed scheme Π′ = (Gencca2,Enccca2,Deccca2) is CCA2-
secure in the standard model.
Proof. The encryption algorithm uses coins r to encrypt challenge message. In
the encryption algorithm, we do not use any cryptographic primitives to be able
to reduce CCA security of the proposed PKE scheme to the hardness or security
of them. Note that we only use the McEliece PKE scheme to encrypt the coins
r and encryption of the challenge message independent of its output.
In the proof of security, we exploit the fact that for a given ciphertext, we can
recover the message if we know the same encoded message y and randomness
r that was used to create the ciphertext. We stress that if either y or r is not
legal values, then the output of the decryption algorithm is random. Thus, the
challenge bit is information-theoretically hidden to the CCA2 adversary, and so,
his advantage in guessing challenge bit is 0.
Let C∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 ) be the challenge ciphertext, where C
∗
1 = (h
∗y∗+r¯∗)r∗+z∗
and y∗ = PCA(mb ⊕G(r
∗), r∗). Denote the secret randomness used to encrypt
mb by r
∗. Assume towards contradiction that there is an efficient adversary
A breaking CCA2 security of the proposed PKE scheme with non-negligible
probability. That is, the adversary A can guess challenge bit with non-
negligible probability at least from one of the below cases. Since a decryption
query on the challenge ciphertext is forbidden by the CCA2-experiment, thus if
C1 = C
∗
1 , then C2 6= C
∗
2 and vice versa. Therefore, there are three possible cases:
Case1. C = (C1, C2) 6= (C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 ). In this case, the decryption oracle
takes as input (C1, C2) and compute r = DecMcE(C2) ∈ {0, 1}
k. If r = r∗
while C2 6= C
∗
2 , then the decryption oracle will reject in (2). It also computes l,
ui = (r + i) mod (l − i), 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, s =
∑l−1
i=1 ui(l − i)! and z =
∑l−1
i=1 ui. In
the worst case, we assume y = ((C1−z)/r− r¯)/h is a (n+ l⌈n/l⌉−n)-bit integer.
That is, there is an integer y such that C1 = (hy+ r¯)r+z. The decryption oracle
computes y′ = CS−1r mod n,|y|(y) and decodes y
′ based on recovered coins r and
computed value s. We have m˜ = PCA−1(y′, r, s) 6= PCA−1(y′∗, r∗, s∗) = m˜∗,
even we assume y′ = y′∗. If we also assume condition (6) holds (i.e.,
Lsbl⌈n/l⌉−n(m˜ ⊕ G(r)) = Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n(r)), then the decryption oracle outputs
random string m = Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n(m˜ ⊕G(r)) in (7). Since m is a random string,
thus challenge bit is information-theoretically hidden to the CCA2 adversary,
and so, his advantage to guess challenge bit is 0.
Case2. C = (C∗1 , C2 6= C
∗
2 ). In this case, the decryption oracle takes as
input (C∗1 , C2) and compute r = DecMcE(C2). If r = r
∗ while C2 6= C
∗
2 ,
then the decryption oracle will reject in (2). In the worst case, we as-
sume y = ((C∗1 − z)/r − r¯)/h is a (n + l⌈n/l⌉ − n)-bit integer and
y′ = CS−1r mod n,|y|(y) = y
′∗. Since r is illegal, i.e. r 6= r∗ (and so s 6= s∗),
thus m˜ = PCA−1(y′, r, s) 6= PCA−1(y′∗, r∗, s∗) = m˜∗. If we also assume
condition (6) is hold, then the decryption algorithm outputs random string
m = Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n(m˜ ⊕ G(r)) in (7). Therefore, challenge bit is information-
theoretically hidden to the CCA2 adversary, and so, his advantage to guess
challenge bit is 0.
Case3. C = (C1 6= C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 ). In this case, the decryption oracle takes
as input (C1, C
∗
2 ) and compute r = DecMcE(C
∗
2 ) = r
∗. It also computes
y = ((C1 − z
∗)/r∗ − r¯∗)/h∗ 6= y∗ 4. In the worst case, we assume y is an integer.
We consider tree possible cases for y:
4 In this case we have y 6= y∗. If y = y∗, then we have C1 = (h
∗y + r¯∗)r∗ + z∗ =
(h∗y∗ + r¯∗)r∗ + z∗ = C∗1 , which is a contradiction since a decryption query on the
challenge ciphertext is forbidden by the CCA2-experiment.
a) y is a multiple of y∗. That is, for any k ∈ N, k 6= 1 we have y = ky∗. In this
case |y| = |k||y∗| 6= |y∗| = n+ l⌈n/l⌉ − n and the decryption oracle reject in
(3).
b) |y| = |y∗|, and, y and y∗ are differ from each other only in some bits. In
this case, y′ = CS−1q∗,|y|(y) and y
′∗ = CS−1q∗,|y|(y) are also differ from each
other only in some bits. Therefore, the CCA2 adversary can guess challenge
bit from m′ = PCA−1(y′, r∗, s∗)⊕G(r∗). Without loss of generality, we can
assume y = y∗⊕ei, where ei is the i-th unit vector. Thus we have y = y
∗±2i,
where y and y∗ are the corresponding decimal value of y and y∗. Therefore,
we should have C1 = (y
∗h∗+ r¯∗)r∗+z∗±2ih∗r∗ = C∗1 ±2
ih∗r∗. Since secret
coins r∗ ∈ {0, 1}k is not known to the CCA2 adversary, thus the probability
that CCA2 adversary produce a forgery on C1 is negligible and it is 2
−k.
Therefore, the CCA2 adversary’s advantage in this case is negligible (see also
Proposition1).
c) |y| = |y∗|, and, y 6= y∗ (and so y′ = CS−1q∗,|y|(y)) is a random string. In
this case m′ = PCA−1(y′, r∗, s∗) ⊕ G(r∗) also is a random string and the
decryption oracle outputs random string Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n(m
′). Thus, challenge
bit is information-theoretically hidden to the CCA2 adversary, and so, his
advantage to guess challenge bit is 0.
From Case1, Case2 and Case3, the CCA2 adversary advantage to guess
challenge bit is negligible. This contradicts the assumption that the CCA2 adver-
sary can break CCA2 security of the proposed PKE scheme with non-negligible
probability.
3.3 Performance analysis
The performance-related issues can be discussed with respect to the computa-
tional complexity of key generation, key sizes, encryption and decryption speed.
The resulting encryption scheme is very efficient. The public/secret keys are
roughly as in the original scheme. The time for computing T(·), G(·) and the
time for encoding and decoding is negligible compared to the time for computing
EncMcE and DecMcE. Encryption roughly needs one application of EncMcE, and
decryption roughly needs one application of DecMcE.
As we previously stated, the Niederreiter-based proposed scheme does not
need to perform well-formedness checking. Therefore, compared to Freeman et
al.[10] and Mathew et al.[19] schemes, our scheme is more efficient. The com-
parison of the proposed schemes with existing schemes are presented in Table
1.
Table 1. Comparison with other proposed CCA2-secure code-based cryptosystems
Scheme Public-key Secret key Ciphertext Encryption Decryption
Size Complexity complexity
Dowsley and 2k × pkMcE 2k × skMcE k × CiphMcE k × EncMcE+ 1VerOT −SS+
Do¨ttling
et al.[5,6] 1OT − SS 1× DecMcE+
t× EncMcE
Freeman 2k × pkNie 2k × skNie k × CiphNie k × EncNie+ 1VerOT −SS+
et al.[10] 1OT − SS 1× DecNie+
t× EncNie
Mathew 1 pkNie+ 2× skNie 2× CiphNie 2× EncNie+ 1VerOT −SS+
et al.[19] 1 (n× n) 1 MM+ 1× DecNie+
Matrix 1OT − SS 2× EncNie+
1 MM
Proposed ≈ 1 pkMcE ≈ 1 skMcE ≈ 2CiphMcE ≈ 1EncMcE ≈ 1DecMcE
Scheme +n
McE: McEliece cryptosystem, Nie: Niederreiter cryptosystem, Ciph: Ciphertext,
Ver: Verification, OT − SS: Strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme,
P: Product, D: Division, MM: Matrix Multiplication, PCA: Permutation Com-
bination Algorithm (algorithm 1), PCA−1: Reverse Permutation Combination
Algorithm and t ≤ k.
4 General construction from TDFs
Devising public-key encryption schemes which are secure against chosen cipher-
text attack from low-level primitives has been the subject of investigation by
many researchers. Currently, the minimal security assumption on trapdoor func-
tions need to obtain CCA2-secure PKE schemes, in terms of “black-box” impli-
cations, is that of adaptivity was proposed by Kiltz, Mohassel and O’Neill in
Eurocrypt 2010 [11]. They proposed a black-box one-bit CCA2-secure encryp-
tion scheme and then apply a transform of Myers and shelat [16] from one-bit to
multi-bit CCA-secure encryption scheme. The Myers-shelat conversion is not ef-
ficient; it uses encryption reputation paradigm along with a strongly unforgeable
one-time signature scheme to handle CCA2 security related issues. Therefore, the
resulting encryption scheme needs separate encryption and it is not sufficiently
efficient to be used in practice.
Here, we give direct black-box construction of a CCA2-Secure PKE scheme
from TDFs. Our construction is similar to the construction of Section 3. We
only need to replace the underlying code-based PKE scheme with a OW-TDF.
Let TDF = (Tdg,F,F−1) be an injective TDF. We construct multi-bit PKE
scheme PKE[TDF] = (Gen,Enc,Dec) as follows:
Key Generation. On security parameter k, the generator Gen runs Tdg
to obtain (ek, td) ← Tdg(1k) and return (ek, td). It also chooses PRG
G : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n. pk = (ek,G) is the public key and sk = (td,G) is the
secret key.
Encryption. On inputs (m, ek), where m ∈ {0, 1}n, Enc perform as
follows:
1. Choose coins r ∈ {0, 1}k, r 6= 0, 1k uniformly at random and let wt(r) = h.
If 2h > k then l← h, else l ← k − h.
2. Compute m˜ =m⊕G(r).
3. Set s =
∑l−1
i=1 ui(l− i)!+ul× 0, where ui = (r+ i) mod (l− i), 1 ≤ i ≤ l− 1
and ul = 0, and run PCA encodding algorithm (Algorithm 1) on inputs
(m˜, r, s) to generate encoded message y′ = PCA(m˜, r, s).
4. Perform a circular q-shift on the encoded message y′ and compute y =
CSq,|y′|(y
′), where q = r mod n.
5. Compute
C1 = (hy + r¯)r + z, C2 = F(ek, r),
where r¯ is the decimal value of the complement of r and z =
∑l−1
i=1 ui.
Decryption. On inputs (C, td), Dec perform as follows:
1. Compute coins r as r = F−1(C2, td). Compute r¯ and h = wt(r). If h ≥ k− h
then l ← h, else l← k − h.
2. Compute Us = (u1, . . . , ul−1, 0) and z =
∑l−1
i=1 ui, where ui = (r + i)
mod (l − i) and s =
∑l−1
i=1 ui(l − i)!.
3. Compute
y =
(C1 − z)/r − r¯
h
,
and reject the ciphertext if y is not a (l⌈n/l⌉)-bit integer.
4. Compute y′ = CS−1q,|y|(y). q = r mod n and |y
′| = |y|.
5. Compute m˜ = PCA−1(y′, r, s).
6. Compute m′ = m˜⊕G(r) and RBS = Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n(r). Check wether
Lsbl⌈n/l⌉−n(m
′)
?
= RBS (6)
holds and reject if not. If it holds output
m = Msbl⌈n/l⌉−n(m
′), (7)
else output ⊥.
Theorem 2 Let TDF be a one-way trapdoor function, then the PKE[TDF] de-
fined above is CCA2-secure.
The proof of Theorem2 is similar to the proof of Theorem1 which is omitted.
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